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FOREWORD

Crime, Culpability, and Excuses
JOHN ROBINSON

Two conflicting contemporary phenomena give rise to this
symposium. One is the pervasiveness of violent crime in American life. Annual fluctuations in the crime rate to one side, murder, rape, arson, and the like occur so often as to erode the social
fabric by which we are knit together in community.' The second
phenomenon is the emergent ability of apparently guilty persons
to escape punishment for the criminal violence in which they
have engaged. The O.J. Simpson case to one side, should Lorena
Bobbit have been found not guilty after she cut off her husband's
penis while he slept?2 Or should Erik and Lyle Menendez have
escaped conviction when they were tried for the murder of their
parents, whom they shot while they watched television in the family room of their home?' More generally, should post-traumatic
stress syndrome 4 or the battered woman syndrome 5 constitute
defenses to charges of murder, attempted murder, or other
crimes of violence? Is Alan Dershowitz correct in asserting that
abuse defenses have proliferated to the detriment of the criminal
justice systems of the state and federal governments?6 Or is the
proliferation of abuse defenses evidence of the moral maturity of
those criminal justice systems? It is questions of that sort that we
1. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1994, FIG. 5.1 & No. 350 (114th ed.) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] for data on murder, rape, arson, and other violent
crimes in 1991. For more recent data, see FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1994).
2. On the Bobbit verdict, seeJoel Achenbach and Richard Leiby, We Find
the Defendant... The Bobbit Verdict From the Court of Public Opinion, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 1994, at DOI.
3. On the Menendez case, see HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY
OF A MENENDEZJUROR (1995).

4.

On post-traumatic

stress

syndrome,

see

AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC

ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,

429 (4th ed., 1994).
5. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
6. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994).
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hope to answer in this symposium, but we are conscious that our
readers will assess our proffered answers against the background
of an intolerably high rate of violent crime. In this Foreword I
will argue that clear thinking about culpability is one component
of any adequate assessment of the role that excuses of different
sorts should play in the administration of criminal justice. I will
also argue that clear thinking about culpability is more difficult
and more rare than one might suspect.
I understand culpability to mean blameworthiness, and I
understand culpability to operate in two distinct, if intimately
related, spheres: the moral and the legal. In both spheres paradigmatic culpability involves three elements: wrongful conduct,
actual or constructive awareness of its wrongfulness, and a reasonable level of control over one's own conduct. With respect to
each element, monumental debates rage, but the fact of those
debates should not obscure the paradigm. As I conceive of them,
legal culpability is not coextensive with moral culpability, neither
is the former a proper subset of the latter. Not everything that is
morally culpable is legally culpable, and there may well be
instances of legal culpability attaching to a person who is free of
moral culpability with respect to the conduct in question. Brief
reflection on why both those assertions are true will shed some
light on the structure and function of culpability in ways that will
be useful to the consideration of excuses and of their alleged
abuse.
A strong swimmer is swimming to shore when he sees a child
drowning in six feet of water. The swimmer is not the child's
parent or care-taker, neither is he a lifeguard at that beach. He
swims to shore, letting the child drown. A good case can be
made for the swimmer being morally culpable with respect to the
child's death, but even someone convinced by that case should
still regard the swimmer's legal culpability as an open question.
What is it about legal culpability that keeps it from being concluded by a determination of the moral culpability of the conduct in question? The first component of an answer to this
question must refer to the differing roles that culpability plays in
legal as opposed to moral contexts.
In moral contexts, we address culpability in order to fix
blame, to be sure, but also in order to think through how persons generally should act in certain situations. If we say of Harry
Truman, for example, that he was culpable with respect to the
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dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 7 we are
both blaming him, albeit posthumously, and contributing to a
larger discussion of the conditions, if any, under which the deliberate use of lethal violence on noncombatants in wartime might
be justified. In legal contexts, however, a multiplicity of nonmoral considerations enter into the picture. Where, for example, moral theory usually proceeds as if the mental states of
moral agents were transparent to moral evaluators, legal theory
must assume the relative opacity of the mental states of those persons whose culpability is in question. As Blackstone said:
For though, in foro conscientiae,a fixed design or will to do
an unlawful act is almost as heinous as the commission of
it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart, or
fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they
are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot
punish for what it cannot know.8
Where, moreover, moral theory can proceed in blissful indifference to political considerations, legal theory cannot; it must
factor into its construction of legal culpability the effect of that
construct on the ability of the state to interfere in the lives of its
citizens. If, for example, a state were to construct legal culpability in such a way that it encompassed the use of contraceptives by
married couples, it would have established a predicate for police
searches of "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives." 9 Many citizens would find this
to be outrageous in itself as well as a demented allocation of
scarce police resources. If, on the other hand, a state constructs
legal culpability in such a way that it either left some species of
heinous conduct out of the realm of the culpable or treated it as
only minimally so, that decision might provoke private citizens to
take the law into their own hands in ways that weaken political
and moral community.
Where, finally, moral theory is to a great extent an end in
itself, legal theory should never be oblivious to the function that
legal culpability plays in the operation of any legal system; culpability in every morally adequate legal system serves as the ordinary gatekeeper to that system's punitive institutions. Because of
the close nexus between culpability and punishment, a few words
7. On President Truman's decision to order the dropping of atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see ROBERT MADDOX, WEAPONS FOR VICTORY
(1995).
8. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4121.
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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on punishment must be said before we can conclude these introductory thoughts on culpability.
In the spring of 1994 Hutu Rwandans slaughtered eight
hundred thousand Tutsi Rwandans. 10 During that same year
Bosnian Serbs massacred several thousand Bosnian Muslims at
several different places in Bosnia. 1 Two decades earlier the government of Cambodia systematically killed over one million of its
citizens in an effort to purge the nations of its intellectual elite.'"
In Chile,' 3 Argentina, 4 Brazil, 5 and Paraguay,' 6 military dictatorships caused the death of thousands of dissidents in recent
decades. And before then, Hitler, 7 Stalin,' 8 and Mao 9 killed
millions and turned millions more into slaves of their monstrous
states. Every single murder, rape, and robbery recapitulates on a
small scale the wickedness of these mass atrocities, and every single instance of fraud, larceny, or drunk driving shares with those
more heinous offenses many of the same morally intolerable
elements.
Implicit in each of these wrongs-the genocidal and the
individual-is a message that the wrongdoer addresses to the victim and to the relevant community. That message is both false
and destructive. It calls out for a true and reconstructive
response. The message asserts the moral superiority of the
wrongdoer and the moral triviality of the victim. It denies the
moral community that in fact binds the wrongdoer to the victim
and that prohibits the wrongdoer's trivialization of the victim.
10.

On the slaughter in Rwanda, see ALAIN

GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(1995).

DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND

See also GtRARD

PRUNIER, THE

RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995).
11. On the Bosnia massacres, see NORMAN L. CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA
(1995). See also DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE
WEST (1995).
12. On the Cambodian purge, see MICHAEL HAAS, GENOCIDE BY PROXY
(1991).
13. On the Chilean dictatorship, see REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (1993).
14. On the Argentinian dictatorship and its abuses, see WILLIAM DAVIS,
WARNINGS FROM THE FAR SOUTH (1995).
15. On the Brazilian dictatorship and its abuses, see ARQUIDIOCESE DE SAo
PAULO, BRAZIL: NUNCA MAIS (3d ed. 1985).
16. On the Paraguayan dictatorship and its abuses, see AMERICAS WATCH
COMMITTEE,

PARAGUAY:

LATIN

AMERICA'S

OLDEST

DICrATORSHIP

UNDER

PRESSURE (1986).
17. On Hider, see GERALD FLEMING, HITLER AND THE FINAL SOLUTION
(1984).
18. On Stalin, see ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE
OF THE THIRTIES (1973).
19. On Mao, seeJOHN BYRON, THE CLAWS OF THE DRAGON (1992).
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The response must assert the moral equality of wrongdoer and
victim; it must reassert the prohibition that the wrongdoer has
denied. As the wrongdoer's assertion was embodied in conduct
independent of the assertion, the community's response must go
beyond mere assertion. It is for that reason that for so long as
humans are capable of wrongdoing, punishment will be a necessary feature of those institutions
whose purpose it is to maintain
2°
human community among us.

Why is it so difficult for us to see punishment as, at its core, a
reconstructive response to an intolerable assertion of moral
exceptedness? Surely part of the answer lies in the ugliness of
punishment as we know it. Whether our knowledge of punishment comes from first-hand acquaintance or from third-hand
description, we know it to be terrible. Memories of childhood
punishment remind us of failure, shame, anger, and worse. Both
the history of punishment and its current practice at the governmental level chill us to the bone with their sheer brutality. 21 So
resistant have punitive institutions proven to amelioration that
one could be forgiven for concluding that as necessary as punishment is to the maintenance of moral community among humans,
no human can safely be trusted to administer punishment justly.
As a result, one might further conclude, moral community is
bound to fail. Those who resist so dire a conclusion must either
deny the necessity of punishment or attempt to cleanse it of its
brutality. Let us consider each of those tacks briefly here.
If choice is in principle illusory, if, that is we are all in fact
determined by endogenous 22 and exogenous 2 3 factors that at the
moment of apparent choice are beyond our ken or control, such
that our apparent choosing is not choice at all, then punishment
as a reconstructive response to an intolerable assertion of moral
exceptedness makes no sense at all.24 If choice is illusory, then
the institution of punishment should give way to other institutions, institutions designed to deter, to reform, to rehabilitate, or
to incapacitate as current social theory may suggest. If, on the
20. For an earlier effort on my part to develop the claims made in this
paragraph, see John Robinson, Adolescence, Choice, and Punishment, 5 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 257, 261-62 (1991).
21. On the ugliness of punishment in America today, see MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
22. On the endogenous factors in crime, see, e.g., LAWRENCE TAYLOR,
BORN TO CRIME: THE GENETIC CAUSES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1984).
23. On the exogenous factors in crime, see, e.g., KEITH HARRIES, CRIME
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1980).
.24. For one popular argument for the unintelligibility of punishment
when the conduct in question is determined by factors outside of the control of
the agent, see B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).

6

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

other hand, choice is not illusory, if, that is, after the immense
influence of endogenous and exogenous factors has been
acknowledged, we remain free to kill or not to kill, to rape or not
to rape, to steal or not to steal, then punishment as response
does make sense and should be maintained. This becomes evident as soon as we reflect on the peculiar psychological structure
of wrongful choice..
Wrongful choice is tricky, but not mysterious. None of us is
wholly ignorant of it, either from our own conduct or from the
conduct that others have directed at us or at others about whom
we care. At its core is one form of unwarranted self-preference
or another, some form of illegitimate distortion of moral community. All but the most arrant wrongdoers can live with this
distortion only by rationalizations that for the moment hide the
distortion even from themselves. "It is what he would have done
to me," the wrongdoer says, or "She had no right to it in the first
place." For moral community to exist among us, these rationalizations must be vigorously repudiated. If ever they should pass
for legitimate reasons for action, then the Hobbesian war of all
against all would break out and moral community would collapse. Hence.the heed for punishment as a communal repudiation of the rationalization implicit in all wrongdoing. If
punishment is that repudiation embodied in a burden that a
community deliberately and authoritatively imposes on a wrongdoer for his wrongdoing, then the case for its necessity as an institution has been made.
What then of the ugliness of punishment? What of its brutality? Here too culpability plays a crucial role even if a different
one from the role it plays in justifying punishment as an institution. If the raison d'etre of punishment is the reassertion of the
basic requirements of moral community in response to their
effective denial by the wrongdoer, it follows that the punisher
must take great care to make sure that that reassertion is heard,
that it is not drowned out by the way in which the one being
punished is treated. This consideration supports the massive
efforts over the past two centuries first to reform and later to
rehabilitate incarcerated wrongdoers, 5 and it counts against cur-

25. On the reform of punishment in Western Europe in the eighteenth
century, see MARCELLO MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARLA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL
REFORM (1973). On efforts to reform punishment in nineteenth century
America, see ADAM JAY Hmscm, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY- PRISONS AND
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA

(1992).
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rent efforts either to do away with them or to lock them up and
throw away the key.26
When James Fitzjames Stephen said that it is "highly desirable that criminals should be hated"2 7 and that "the punishments
inflicted upon them should be so contrived as to give expression
to that hatred"" he was, I think, disastrously wrong. It is not
criminals that we should hate, but criminality. We should hate
our own tendency to rationalize unwarranted self-preference,
and we should resist the spread of that tendency in the populace
generally. As for criminals, we should hate what they have done,
and we should support, without illusions, efforts to help them to
live in authentic moral community with the rest of us, 29 but we
should not hate them. Indeed our hatred for them might appear
to justify their brutalization when it is their brutalization that
drowns out the reassertion of the basic requirements of moral
community that is constitutive of punishment as an institution.
Worse still, hating criminals feeds the tendency to think of
them as vastly different from ourselves, almost as members of
another, and morally inferior, species. Given the role that race,
class, and other forms of marginalization play in the composition
of prison populations,3" anything that widens the gap between
the imprisoned and the rest of us is troublesome. Even if no
such gap existed, however, hating criminals would still be an illadvised practice, and any conception of punishment that
presented it as endorsing and facilitating the hatred of prisoners
would be a misconception of it. It is not the moral difference
between us and them that should concern us. It is instead the
moral similarity between them and us that should be our concern. While murder, rape, and arson may not tempt us now,
none of us is free of the rationalizations by which both they and
26. On the current tendency to respond to the intolerably high crime
rate with lengthy sentences, see Hon. J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The
Politicization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1087, 1088-1090 (1995). See also Fox
Butterfield, California Courts Clogging Under Its "Three Strikes" Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1995, at Al, A9.
27. 2 JAMES FrrzjAmEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND,

28.
29.

82 (London, MacMillan 1883).
Id.
On alternatives to incarceration as a mode of punishment, see NORVAL

MORRIS AND MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990). See also INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES (Michael Tonry and Kate Hamilton eds.,

1995).
30. On the racial composition of state prisons in America in 1986 and
1991, see STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at No. 340. See also STEPHEN P.
KLEIN, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING DECISIONS (1991).
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we hide from ourselves our failure to live up to the obligations
implicit in membership in the moral community.31
If reflection on the function of punishment convinces us
that culpability is necessary to just punishment, further reflection
on the function of punishment should suggest that culpability
also imposes a ceiling on how severely wrongdoers can be punished. In an age in which deterrent, rehabilitative, and
incapacitative objectives are assigned crucial roles in the determination of the severity of punishment, we risk weakening the institution of punishment and treating convicted criminals unjustly if
we disregard the culpability cap in our distribution of punishment. It may be that nothing short of life without the possibility
of parole will convince would-be drug dealers not to deal in
drugs, but to give that sentence to a convicted drug dealer without determining also that dealers deserve sentences of that sort is
to threaten punishment with its own self-destruction. 2 I do not
mean to suggest that desert determinations are easy to make; the
incommensurability between crime and punishment makes them
extremely difficult. Without some desert determination, however, punishment could lose its ability to function as a reconstructive response to the intolerable message implicit in all
wrongdoing, and that would be an unmitigated disaster.
What then of excuses? Two extreme positions spring to
mind. The purist position would say that whatever exculpates
morally exculpates legally, making legal culpability a proper subset of moral culpability."3 Realists, led by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., have trenchantly criticized the purists' position as
excessively sensitive to the moral situation of alleged wrongdoers. 4 Realists follow Holmes in permitting the state to sacrifice
individuals and their freedom whenever the state determines
that a sacrifice of that sort is necessary to its own continued existence. 5 We should be both more suspicious of governmental
determinations of the necessity for individual sacrifice and more
respectful of individual freedom than Holmes was, and we
should worry more than he did about what the punishment of
31.

I take this to be the central point of Hannah Arendt's study of evil in

EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1971).

32. For a heated exchange among the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court on this question, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
(1991). See also, People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992).
33. See, for example, Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974
(1932). See also JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 146-170
(2d ed. 1947).
34. See, for example, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 3976 (1881).
35.

Id. at 43.
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the morally exculpated will do to the institution of punishment.
But how suspicious, how respectful, and how worried should we
be? For answers to those questions, we must turn to our
symposiasts.
In Culpability and Commonsense Justice, Norman J. Finkel, a
psychologist, argues that jurors do a better job of determining
culpability than the law books do. He also suggests that the common-sense justice that is revealed in jury verdicts can assist the
law in its effort to get culpability questions right. He says, for
example, that community sentiment in America today distinguishes sharply between true murder and felony murder, prescribing a significantly more severe punishment for the former
than for the latter. With respect to insanity as an exculpator, Finkel argues that common sense rejects its medicalization in favor
of an insanity test that is more closely connected to the defendant's capacity to make responsible choices. With respect to manslaughter, finally, Finkel argues that common sense does a
significantly better job of determining an enraged killer's culpability than does the criminal law with all of its fine distinctions.
Finkel would have us learn from jurors (real and mock) that
judgments in criminal cases are just only when they reflect the
blameworthiness of the accused, and he would have us realize
how regularly the law, as it is currently constructed, ignores
blameworthiness in favor of attractive but illusory alternatives.
In TransferredIntent, Douglas Husak undertakes a critique of
the hoary doctrine according to which a person can be punished
for victimizing a person other than his intended victim. His goal
in this critique is not to exculpate the victimizer. It is instead to
produce a better account of why the victimizer deserves punishment than current doctrine can produce. Unlike Finkel, whose
research is highly empirical, Husak proceeds by way of a consideration of twelve variations upon the focal case of transferred
intent. Each of these variations is intended to call attention to a
constitutive feature of the focal case. From this inquiry Husak
concludes that the whole idea of transferred intent is a fictionintents not being the sort of thing that can be transferred. He
also finds this particular legal fiction to be quite useless. Husak
proposes that we discard it in favor of an approach that focuses
directly on whether or not the defendant deserves to be punished as severely as someone who had succeeded in victimizing
his or her intended victim in some particular way. To this extent,
Husak and Finkel are in agreement; they both believe that a legal
system improves as it transcends mere doctrine and addresses the
hard but dispositive questions of culpability.
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In The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, Benjamin Sendor does not deviate from the Finkel/Husak
consensus. Sendor's focus, however, is quite different from
theirs. What Sendor wants to do is to show that the overall moral
goodness or badness of a person-what he calls the person's
character-should not be a criterion of guilt or innocence in a
well-ordered criminal justice system. He therefore rejects what
he calls the "character theory" of criminal liability, distinguishing
it carefully from what he calls a moral agency theory. Sendor
admits that character is relevant to punishment, but he believes
that it should be limited to the time of sentencing and should
not be considered when the guilt or innocence of the accused is
being decided.
Sendorjustifies this limitation on the role that character can
play in the criminal process on grounds of political morality. A
well-ordered state, he says, leaves its citizens alone until they have
done things that justifies the state in interfering in their lives.
Sendor argues, furthermore, that a conduct-driven criminal justice system can serve as an incentive to socially acceptable behavior in ways that a character-driven system could not. Finally,
Sendor says, a conduct-driven criminal justice system is both
more fair to citizens generally and more compatible with the
restorative function of punishment than a character-driven system would be. It is for these reasons that Sendor would confine
considerations of character to the sentencing phase of the criminal process. Sendor is careful not to dismiss character theorists
out of hand. He is in substantial agreement with them on several
points, especially with respect to the claim that criminal conduct
ordinarily expresses something to which any well-ordered legal
system must respond. He differs from character theorists as to
what it is that criminal conduct expresses.
For all three of our lead authors, therefore, culpability determinations are crucial to the proper functioning of a criminal justice system. All three, furthermore, find excuses to be crucially
important to culpability determinations. Our hope is that their
discussions of culpability and excusing exculpators constitute a
significant contribution to the important national debate on this
issue that is being conducted in the courts, in the several legislatures, and in the media.

